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Abstract 
This paper uses an experimental approach to study whether nationality serves as a 
focal point. We let subjects from Japan, Korea, and China play stag-hunt coordination 
games in which we vary information about their partner. The results show that subjects 
are more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if the only piece 
of information they have about their partner is that they have the same nationality. 
However, if subjects receive additional information about their partner, subjects are not 
more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff dominant equilibrium. We also do not find 
that subjects are less likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium when 
their partner has a different nationality as compared to when the partner’s nationality is 
unknown. In addition, we observe that giving subjects information about their partner in 
general increases the risk of miscoordination. Thus, our findings suggest that nationality 
can serve as a coordination device but also that the scope of this device is limited. 
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I. Introduction 
The beginning of the new millennium has been marked by increased social, economic, 
technological, and cultural integration. These phenomena have in turn promoted contact between 
individuals from different countries and cultural backgrounds putting higher demands on the 
coordination of actions.
3 In this context it is important to understand if and how coordination 
depends on the cultural backgrounds of the participating actors. One stylized fact in the 
economic literature on coordination is that in the absence of additional information, people tend 
to use a solution which seems relevant, natural, or special to them. This solution is known as a 
focal point (Schelling, 1960; Crawford and Haller, 1990; Mehta et al., 1994; Sugden, 1995; 
Camerer, 2003). Culture or nationality may be such a focal point and hence one may hypothesize 
that nationality serves as a coordination device and that miscoordination is more likely to occur 
if interactions take place between partners from different nationalities (Schelling, 1960; Sugden, 
1986).  
In this paper we investigate whether and under which circumstances nationality serves as a 
coordination device in coordination games (Crawford and Haller, 1990; Cooper et al., 1990; Van 
Huyck et al., 1990; Crawford, 1995). For this purpose we made use of the diverse student body 
at the University of Hawaii and recruited an equal amount of Japanese, Korean, and Chinese 
nationals. The subjects play simple stag-hunt coordination games with a payoff-dominant and a 
risk-dominant equilibrium, and interact both with their compatriots and with participants from 
the other two countries. To test for the robustness of the relevance of nationality as a focal point 
we provide subjects with different levels of information about their partner: (i) no information, 
                                                 
3 We use the term culture, cultural background, and nationality interchangeably in this paper. For a survey on the 
different definitions for culture consult e.g. Kroeber and Kluckhorn (1952). Culture certainly has many meanings 
and nationality is just one aspect of it, albeit an important one. We use nationality as a proxy for culture and discuss 
the strength of this proxy and other aspects of culture in the conclusion.   3  
(ii) information only about their partner’s nationality (i.e. nationality is salient), and (iii) 
information about their partner’s nationality and some other presumably irrelevant characteristics 
such as hair color (i.e. we make nationality non-/ less salient). In addition, we observe the 
subjects’ level of pro-sociality towards subjects from other nationalities and compatriots in 
ultimatum and dictator games to investigate whether potential differences in coordination are 
driven by in-group favoritism (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). 
Our findings show that nationality can indeed serve as a coordination device. Subjects are 
more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if common nationality is 
salient as compared to if subjects do not know the nationality of their partner. However, if 
nationality is non-salient, nationality does not serve as a coordination device, i.e. subjects are not 
more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if their partner has the same 
nationality. Moreover, we do not find that subjects are less likely to try to coordinate on the 
payoff-dominant equilibrium if their partner has a different nationality as compared to when the 
partner’s nationality is unknown. Interestingly, we also find that giving the subjects information 
about their partner in general increases the risk of miscoordination.  
To the best of our knowledge this is the first experimental paper studying inter-cultural 
coordination between different nationalities in a systematic manner and inter-cultural behavior 
where the salience of nationality is experimentally manipulated.
4 Our paper does not only 
contribute to the literature on coordination games which are characterized by the existence of 
more than one Nash equilibrium (Crawford and Haller, 1990; Cooper et al., 1990; Van Huyck et 
al., 1990; Crawford, 1995) but also to the literature comparing behavior across cultures (Roth et 
                                                 
4 Brandts and Cooper (2007) compare the behavior of subjects in the USA and Spain and observe higher levels of 
coordination in the USA. This study, however, does not investigate coordination between subjects from different 
nationalities. Related to our findings is also the study by Crawford et al. (2008) in which the authors find that 
miscoordination increases if the salience of focal points is reduced by minimally changing payoff constellations, and 
Holm (2000) who finds that information about gender affects coordination in a battle-of-sexes game.   4  
al., 1991; Okada and Riedl, 1999; Anderson et al., 2000; Henrich, 2000; Henrich et al., 2001; 
Brandts et al., 2004), between cultures (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Buchan et al.,2006; Chuah 
et al., 2007; Bornhorst et al, 2008) and more generally to the literature on in- and out-group 
behavior (Sherif et al., 1961; Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Kollock, 1998; Eckel and Grossman, 
2005; Goette et al., 2006; Charness et al., 2007; McLeish and Oxoby, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009) 
which typically reports that individuals treat in-group members better than out-group members. 
Most of these studies do not manipulate the salience of group membership. Exceptions are 
Eckel and Grossman (2005) and Charness et al. (2007) which create minimal groups to study 
cooperation and increase group identity by team goal attainment or passive audiences. Consistent 
with our findings, these two studies point out that the saliency of group membership affects 
behavior. In contrast to these studies, we investigate coordination among natural groups of 
people with different nationalities and manipulate group identity by providing subjects with 
different levels of information about their partners. 
While making group membership salient has its merits when studying minimal groups, 
saliency of group membership may limit the generalizability of studies using natural groups. 
First, by making natural group memberships salient it seems plausible that subjects react to 
experimenter demand effects which are not present outside the laboratory. Second, as people 
outside the laboratory environment often have more information about their interaction partners 
than only their membership in one particular group, the saliency induced in the laboratory may 
bias behaviors. Our findings suggest that there may be fewer differences between in- and out-
group behaviors if the salience of group membership is reduced and that in-group favoritism may 
play a less important role for coordination.  
This paper continues as follows. The next section presents the experimental design. Section   5  
III describes the results, and section IV concludes. 
 
II. Experimental Design 
The inter-cultural coordination experiment consists of four parts: (1) A short pre-
experimental questionnaire to collect the subjects` nationality and some demographic 
information. (2) Instructions and control questions for the games. The complete set of 
experimental instructions and questionnaires is given in the Appendix. (3) The games. All 
subjects first took part in three ultimatum games and three dictator games before they played 
three coordination games. Each game was presented to the subjects separately and they received 
no information about the behavior of other subjects or the outcomes of the games until the end of 
the whole experiment. Players were randomly paid for one of the nine games. In addition, we 
used the perfect stranger matching, so no player knew the identity of his co-player and no player 
was ever matched with the same player twice. Therefore, there is no theoretical reason to believe 
that the behavior in the coordination games is contaminated by the preceding games.
5 We focus 
in this paper on the behavior in the coordination games and mainly use the behavior in the other 
games to facilitate the interpretation of our coordination findings.  
The three coordination games (as well as the three ultimatum and dictator games) differ 
according to the matching and were presented in random order. In one decision, a subject was 
matched with a person from the same nationality, and in the other two she was matched with 
subjects from other nationalities than her own nationality. The matching algorithm is presented 
in Figure 1. The experiment was programmed using Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). (4) The 
                                                 
5 In principle, there could be order effects, i.e. subjects may in general play a coordination game differently after 
playing e.g. a dictator game. However, because our main analysis compares treatments where the order was 
identical, our treatment differences cannot be subject to order effects. We briefly examine relationships between 
ultimatum game, dictator game, and coordination game behavior in section III.   6  
experiment ended with a short post-experimental questionnaire before subjects were paid 
privately. 
There are three across-subject treatments in this experiment which differ by the amount of 
information subjects have about their matched partners: control (treatment C), salient 
information about partner’s nationality (treatment S), and non-salient information about partner’s 
nationality (treatment NS). In C, a subject receives no information about her partner. In S, the 
only piece of information a subject receives is the nationality of her partner. In NS, a subject 
receives information about the age, status at UH (junior, sophomore, junior, senior or graduate 
student), eye color, hair color, and nationality of her partner. No subject participated in more 
than one treatment. 
The coordination game we study is a symmetric two-person stag-hunt game in which the 
subjects simultaneously choose either A or B. The earnings are determined depending on their 
choice and the choice of their match according to the payoff matrix presented in Table 1. For 
example, if participant 1 chooses A, then participant 2 gets seven tokens if she chooses A and 
one token if she chooses B. Each token is worth one dollar if the game is chosen for payment. 
Note that choice B is more risky for the subject as she could either make nine or one token 
depending on the choice of her match. In contrast, choice A is less risky as it secures at least 
seven tokens regardless of the other subject’s decision. There are two Nash equilibria in this 
game: (A,A) which is the risk-dominant equilibrium, and (B,B) which is the payoff-dominant 
equilibrium. Charness (2000) studies this game with the same parameter specifications.  
In the ultimatum games a proposer has to decide how to divide ten tokens between her and a 
responder. If the responder accepts, the offer is implemented; however, if she rejects both player 
types receive zero tokens. We implemented the strategy method for the responders, i.e. responder   7  
had to decide over their minimal acceptable offer before they knew the actual offer of the 
proposer. In the dictator games, the proposer also has to decide how to divide ten tokens between 
her and a responder but the responder cannot reject the offer. 
A total of seven sessions were conducted in the UH Experimental Laboratory in April 2009 
(two sessions for treatments C and NS each, three sessions for treatment S
6). Sessions typically 
included 18 participants: 6 Japanese, 6 Korean, and 6 Chinese students. A total of 126 subjects 
participated in the experiment (42 Japanese, 38 Korean, 42 Chinese, and 4 other nationalities).
7  
68 percent of the subjects are female. 57 percent identify themselves very strongly, 41 
percent somewhat, and 2 percent not at all with their nationality. 55 percent report to have a GPA 
of 3 (= mean grade in their university classes, 4 is the best), and 37 percent a GPA of 4. With 
regard to the information subjects receive about their partner in the NS treatment we observe that 
55 percent have black and 44 percent brown eyes, 86 percent have black and 13 percent brown 
hair. The mean age is 25 years. 38 percent are graduate, 25 percent are senior, 21 percent junior, 
and 16 percent sophomore and freshman students. Each subject participated only in one session.  
Sessions lasted approximately 45 minutes and the subjects earned on average $13 ($5 show-up 
fee, plus their earnings from the experimental sessions). Table 2 presents a summary of the 
sessions.  
 
                                                 
6 We had to conduct an extra session for the S treatment due to an insufficient number of Korean participants present 
at one of the previous sessions.  
7 Subjects were recruited with campus flyers and e-mail announcements. Interested individuals were asked to fill out 
socio-demographic information as well as to report their nationality. We invited only individuals who reported to be 
Japanese, Korean, or Chinese. However, during the experimental sessions four participants answered in the pre-
experimental questionnaire to be of another nationality (one participant in NS and three participants in S). 
Accordingly, in our analysis we exclude these participants and the participants that were matched with these in the S 
and NS treatments. More precisely, we excluded from our analysis three observations in NS and nine observations in 
S. None of the subjects analyzed in our results had a dual nationality. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were 
not allowed to talk to each other.   8  
III. Results 
Across all nationalities and treatments we find that in the coordination games the risky 
alternative B was chosen with a probability of 0.441 (156 out of 354 times). There are no 
significant differences in the mean probability to choose B among nationalities. 46.7 percent of 
the Japanese choose B which is insignificantly more than Chinese (44.3 percent; Fisher’s exact 
test, p = 0.797, two-sided) or Korean (40.9 percent; Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.427, two-sided). 
18.1 percent of the pairings achieve the payoff dominant equilibrium (B,B) (with payoff  of 
(9,9)), 29.9 percent the risk dominant equilibrium (A,A) (with payoff  of (7,7)), and 52 percent 
miscoordinate, i.e. the outcomes are either (A,B) (payoff (1,8)) or (B,A) (payoff (8,1)).  
In the control treatment, we observe that 42.6 percent choose B (Japanese: 47.2 percent, 
Chinese: 41.7 percent, Korean: 38.9 percent). In the salient treatment, 45.8 percent choose B 
(Japanese: 47.1 percent, Chinese: 41.2 percent, Korean: 50 percent), and in the non-salient 
treatment 43.1 percent (Japanese: 45.7 percent, Chinese: 51.4 percent, Korean: 31.5 percent).  
In the dictator games, the mean token amount sent is 3.26 (treatment C = 3.33, S = 3.00, NS 
= 3.55). In the ultimatum games, the mean token amount sent is 4.75 out of 10 (treatment C = 
4.62, S = 5.12, NS = 4.33) and the mean minimal acceptable offer is 3.12 (treatment C = 3.13, S 
= 3.35, NS = 2.78). The mean individual behavior in the three coordination games is not 
significantly correlated to the mean individual behavior in the three dictator games (r = 0.059, p 
= 0.654), the mean individual proposer behavior in the ultimatum games (r = 0.194, p = 0.138) or 
the mean individual minimal acceptable offer in the ultimatum games (r = 0.073, p = 0.574). 
Table 3 summarizes the means of all three treatments under the two different matchings 
(different or same nationalities) for the coordination, ultimatum, and dictator games. 
   9  
Conjecture 1: Nationality serves as a coordination device if nationality is salient. 
We observe that 56.3 percent of the subjects (27 out of 48) choose B in treatment S if they 
know that their partner has the same nationality. This percentage is considerably higher than the 
equivalent percentage in the control treatment C (42.6 percent; p = 0.057, chi
2 = 2.49, one-sided).  
This finding is robust after controlling for the subject’s nationality, her level of identity with her 
nationality, GPA and gender (Table 4, model 1, p = 0.025). Identity and GPA predict positively 
the choice to play B (p<0.062). Model 1 also shows that both Korean and Chinese tend to be less 
likely to choose B in treatment C (p<0.144).  
Figure 2 illustrates that the strength of the coordination device (i.e., the information that the 
partner is a compatriot) depends on the nationality. We observe that the probability that subjects 
play B is highest in the treatment condition S-IN (treatment S, partner is compatriot) for all three 
nationalities. However, for Japanese subjects salient information about the partner being 
Japanese has very little impact on the willingness to choose B as compared to having no 
information about the partner’s nationality in treatment C (50 vs. 47.2 percent). In contrast, 
Korean subjects are more likely to choose B when paired with another Korean (66.7 vs. 38.9 
percent; p = 0.047, Chi
2 = 2.80, one-sided). Chinese subjects are moderately more likely to 
choose B when paired with another Chinese (55.6 vs. 41.7 percent; p = 0.167, Chi
2 = 0.93, one-
sided). 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the outcomes in all treatments and distinguishes between 
the payoff outcomes (9,9), (7,7), and (1,8 which includes 8,1). This figure illustrates that the 
more pronounced willingness to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium leads to more 
payoff-dominant outcomes (7 out of 24 or 29.2 percent) when matched with someone from the 
same nationality than in C (12 out of 54 or 22.2 percent). It also leads to less coordination on the   10  
risk-dominated equilibrium than in C (16.7 vs. 37 percent) and when matched with someone 
from a different nationality in S (31.3 percent). Later in finding 4 we will analyze in more depth 
the level of miscoordination in our treatments.  
Interestingly, we do not find that subjects behave more pro-socially towards their compatriots 
in the dictator game. For example, in treatment S the mean transfer in the dictator game to a 
compatriot (3.32) is almost identical as compared to the mean transfers in treatments C (3.33).
8 
This suggests that our finding that compatriots are more willing to coordinate on the payoff-
dominant equilibrium is not primarily driven by a propensity – or a potential experimental 
demand effect – to behave more pro-socially towards compatriots. However, we find differential 
treatment in the ultimatum game on the side of the proposer: The mean offer in treatment S to a 
compatriot (5.25) is higher than the mean offer in treatment C (4.62, p = 0.069, Mann-Whitney, 
two-sided).
9 On the side of the responder we find that the minimal acceptable offer is statistically 
insignificantly higher in treatment S when paired with a compatriot as compared to treatment C 
(3.5 vs. 3.13, p = 0.326, Mann-Whitney test). 
Finding 1: We find evidence that nationality serves as a coordination device if nationality is 
salient: Subjects are more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if 
matched with someone from the same nationality. The strength of this coordination device 
depends on the nationality.  
 
                                                 
8 Note also that if we only look at Koreans – in whom the propensity to coordinate with a compatriot is most 
pronounced – we also find no such statistical differences. In the dictator game, Koreans even give more in treatment 
C (3.73) than to compatriots in treatment S (3.17). 
9 This finding is in line with the finding in Chuah et al (2007) who find that Malaysian Chinese subjects gave on 
average higher offers in the ultimatum game to compatriots as compared to subjects from the United Kingdom. Note 
that there are procedural differences between our and their study. In particular, Chuah et al. conducted their 
experiments in their subjects’ respective home countries (Malaysia or United Kingdom) whereas we conducted our 
experiments outside the subjects’ home countries.   11  
Conjecture 2: Nationality serves as a coordination device also if nationality is non-salient. 
44.1 percent (15 out of 34) subjects choose B if they play with someone from the same 
nationality in treatment NS. This percentage is not statistically different from the percentage in 
the control treatment (42.6 percent). Note also that none of the other pieces of information that 
we gave subjects about their partner in the NS treatment (age, status, hair color, eye color) is 
significantly related to the choice of B (p > 0.33, Spearman). Table 4, model 2 shows that even 
after controlling for our co-variates, subjects are not more likely to choose B when matched with 
a compatriot in NS (p = 0.987). 
In Figure 3 we observe a low fraction of payoff-dominant outcomes in treatment NS when 
paired with a compatriot (12.5 percent) and a high level of miscoordination on the outcomes 
((8,1) (1,8)) which is even somewhat higher than in treatment C (64.7 percent in NS compared to 
40.7 percent in C; p = 0.101, Fisher’s exact test, two-sided).  
We also do not find that subjects behave more pro-socially towards their compatriots if 
nationality is non-salient in the dictator and ultimatum game. In the dictator game, subjects give 
3.35 tokens to compatriots (treatment C = 3.32). In the ultimatum game, subjects offer 4.28 
tokens to compatriots in treatment NS (treatment C = 4.62) and the minimal acceptable offer is 
2.35 when matched with a compatriot in NS (treatment C = 3.13, p = 0.185, Mann-Whitney).  
Finding 2: Nationality does not serve as a coordination device if nationality is non-salient. 
Subjects are not more likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium with 
someone from the same nationality if they are provided with additional information about their 
partner.  
   12  
Conjecture 3: Coordination is more difficult if subjects know that their partner has a different 
nationality. 
40.6 percent (39 out of 96) of the participants choose B if they play with someone from a 
different nationality in treatment S. 42.6 percent (29 out of 68) of the subjects choose B if they 
play with someone from a different nationality in NS. These percentages are not different from 
the percentage in treatment C (42.6 percent, chi
2, p > 0.776). The non-significant impact of 
knowing that the partner has a different nationality is also confirmed in Models 3 (for treatment 
S) and 4 (for treatment NS) of Table 4 (p>0.453). 
In Figure 3 we can see that only a low fraction of outcomes are payoff-dominant (12.5 
percent) when matched with someone from a different nationality in S. Moreover, 56.3 percent 
miscoordinate on the outcomes ((8,1) (1,8)) in S when matched with someone from a different 
nationality which is insignificantly higher than in C (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.164, two-sided). 
Also in treatment NS, few outcomes are payoff-dominant when matched with someone from a 
different nationality (14.7 percent) – but this percentage is still higher than when matched with 
someone from the same nationality in NS (11.8 percent).  55.9 percent miscoordinate on the 
outcomes (8,1) and (1,8) which is somewhat higher than in the control treatment (40.7 percent, p 
= 0.192, two-sided, Fisher’s exact test) but less than when matched with someone from the same 
nationality in S (64.7 percent). 
Finding 3: Subjects are not less likely to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium if 
they know that their partner has a different nationality regardless whether nationality is salient 
or non-salient.  
   13  
Figure 3 illustrates an additional finding: Miscoordination, i.e. the outcomes (1,8) and (8,1) 
are considerably less likely in the control treatment (40.7 percent) as compared to the treatments 
S and NS regardless whether subjects in these two treatments are matched with someone from 
their own or another nationality (miscoordination ranges in these cases from 54.2 to 64.7 
percent). The difference between the C and the S treatment is significant at p = 0.100 (Chi
2 = 
2.710); i.e. already providing participants with information about their partners` nationality is 
enough to increase the risk of miscoordination. Part of this difference is likely explainable from 
the fact that subjects try harder to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in S when 
matched with a compatriot.  
The difference between the C and NS treatment is also significant (p = 0.064, Chi
2 = 3.431); 
i.e. providing subjects with information about their partners` nationality, university status, hair 
color, eye color, and age increases the risk of miscoordination to an even larger extent. The 
difference between the control and the S and NS treatments combined is significant at p = 0.047 
(Chi
2 = 3.931). As the probabilities of choosing B are similar in treatments C and NS (and S if 
matched with someone from a different nationality), this difference cannot be explained by a 
general tendency of subjects trying harder to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in 
one of the two treatments. One possibility could be that additional information about partners 
makes some subjects more and others less willing to try to coordinate on the payoff-dominant 
equilibrium.  
Finding 4: The probability of miscoordination is higher if subjects have salient and/or non-
salient information about their partners’ nationality.  
 
  We finish this section by investigating the role of the constellations of nationalities.   14  
Figure 4 provides an overview of the probability of choosing B depending on the treatment and 
the constellation of nationalities. The Figure shows some interesting, nationality specific 
patterns. First, we observe that Japanese subjects, who seemed according to Figure 2 not to 
discriminate between compatriots and other nationals, behave differently towards Koreans (only 
27 percent choose B when paired with a Korean in treatment S) and Chinese (61 percent). 
Korean subjects tend to be less likely to choose B when the information about their partner’s 
nationality is non-salient as compared to when it is salient. The opposite is true for Chinese, who 
tend to be less likely to choose B when the information about their partner’s nationality is salient. 
For example, when a Chinese only knows that her partner is Japanese (treatment S), she chooses 
B with a probability of 0.28 as compared to a probability of 0.5 when additional information 
about the partner is available besides her Japanese nationality (treatment NS). 
  Interestingly, in S and NS combined subjects are quite unlikely to choose B if their 
partner is Japanese and not a compatriot (35.7 percent). This percentage is lower than when the 
partner is Korean (40.4 percent) or Chinese (48.2 percent). While these differences are not 
uniform and not yet statistically significant, the patterns are consistent with a history of national 
disagreements in the region. Namely, one may speculate that both the Chinese and Korean 
subjects are biased against the Japanese in response to the Japanese imperialist policy and 




In this paper we experimentally test the relevance and scope of focal points when individuals 
make decisions under strategic uncertainty. In a period which is marked by extensive 
international trade, nationality may present one important focal point which individuals can   15  
coordinate on. What is the relevance and scope of nationality as a coordination device? We 
recruited subjects coming from three countries that heavily engage in international trade and let 
them play coordination games in three treatments in which we manipulated the information they 
receive about their partner.
10  
Our findings suggest that nationality can function as a coordination device but that the scope 
of this device is limited. Subjects attempt to coordinate more on the payoff-dominant equilibrium 
if their partner has the same nationality and the information about the partners` nationality is 
salient. We provide suggestive evidence showing that this difference is not the result of more 
pro-social behavior towards compatriots, i.e. in-group favoritism.  However, if the information 
about the partners` nationality is not salient, i.e. nationality is only one of several other attributes 
which subjects know about their partner, nationality seems to be irrelevant for coordination. 
Moreover, overall we do not find in our study that coordination is more difficult between 
partners of different nationalities. 
One possible explanation of these results may lie in the multi-dimensional nature of culture 
in this experiment. While nationality certainly comprises one aspect of culture, it does not 
represent the full extent of it. Besides being nationals of three different countries, subjects in this 
experiment are all students of University of Hawaii and are united by a university culture and 
international community. As the focus is diluted away from nationality in the non-salient 
treatment, common culture for university students may dominate and hence the results on 
nationalities are weakened.  
More generally, one may speculate that the scope of nationality as a coordination device is 
limited outside the laboratory environment because (i) interacting parties often have access to 
                                                 
10 According to the size of their exports China ranks 2
nd, Japan 4
th, and Korea 12
th. From 2000-2008 China has 
almost six-folded, Japan and Korea have more than doubled, their exports. Data from United Nations Statistics 
Department available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/trade/imts/annual%20totals.htm.   16  
more information about their partners than only their nationality and (ii) there is a probability 
that they share different cultural aspects. On the other hand, our findings also suggest that having 
more information about trading partners may not necessarily be beneficial as it seems to increase 
the risk of miscoordination. Moreover, our experimental results imply that coordination is not 
more difficult between parties from different nationalities if subjects have more information 
about their partners than only their nationality.   
We believe that our paper also contributes to the growing cross-cultural literature and the 
economic literature on group identity. Our findings suggest the necessity of conducting 
experiments which manipulate the salience of cultural and group membership for testing the 
robustness of the findings in the in- and out-group literature which use natural groups.  
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Figures 1-3: 
Figure 1:  Matching Algorithm 
 
(6) represents a number of participants from each nationality present in a session   21  
Figure 2: Choice to try to coordinate on payoff-dominant equilibrium depending on 

































S-IN NS-IN C NS-OUT S-OUT S-IN NS-IN C NS-OUT S-OUT S-IN NS-IN C NS-OUT S-OUT
Japanese Korean Chinese
 
Notes: S-IN: Treatment S, subject is paired with compatriot; NS-IN: Treatment NS, subject is paired with 
compatriot, C: Treatment C, subject does not know nationality of partner, NS-OUT: Treatment NS, subject is paired 
with partner from a different nationality, S-OUT: Treatment S, subject is paired with partner from a different 
nationality.   22  
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Figure 4: Choice to try to coordinate on payoff-dominant equilibrium depending on 































S-CH NS-CH S-KO NS-KO S-CH NS-CH S-JA NS-JA S-KO NS-KO S-JA NS-JA
Japanese Korean Chinese
 
Notes: S-CH: Treatment S, subject is paired with Chinese; NS-CH: Treatment NS, subject is paired with Chinese, S-
KO: Treatment S, subject is paired with Korean; NS-KO: Treatment NS, subject is paired with Korean, S-JA: 
Treatment S, subject is paired with Japanese; NS-JA: Treatment NS, subject is paired with Japanese. 
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Tables 1-3: 
 
Table 1: Payoff Matrix in Coordination Game 
 
    subject 2 











A  7,7  8,1 
B  1,8  9,9 
 
 
Table 2: Experimental Design   
     
Treatment  Number of observations in 
coordination game  
   
Control (C)  J-J: 11 
(no information)  K-K: 11 
  C-C: 11 
  J-K: 21 
  J-C:  22 
  K-C: 22 
Total observations:   108 
Salient (S)  J-J: 18 
(subjects know only   K-K:12 
their partner’s   C-C:18 
nationality)  J-K: 30 
  J-C: 36 
  K-C: 30 
                     Total observations:   144 
Non-salient (NS)   
(Subjects know  their   J-J: 12 
partner’s age, status  K-K:10 
at UH, eye color, hair   C-C:12 
color,  & nationality)  J-K: 22 
  J-C: 24 
  K-C: 22 
                    Total observations:  102 
J: Japanese, K: Korean, C: Chinese and treatments as: 
C: Control, NS: Non-salient, and S: Salient 
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Table 3: Behavior in Ultimatum, Dictator, and Coordination Game (means, N) 
           
  C - Treatment  S - Treatment  NS - Treatment 
      different  compatriot  different  compatriot 
proposer                
(offer) 
4.62  5.06  5.25  4.38  4.28 
53  48  24  32  18 
responder           
(MAO) 
3.13  3.27  3.50  3.00  2.35 
53  48  24  33  17 
dictator                 
(offer) 
3.33  2.83  3.32  3.65  3.35 
54  48  25  34  17 
coordination 
(probability B) 
0.43  0.41  0.56  0.43  0.44 
108  96  48  68  34 
Note:  Italic numbers are number of observations. Bold numbers indicate significant differences. In 
some cells are odd numbers because we excluded observations whenever a participant was matched 
with someone whose nationality is not Chinese, Korean, or Japanese.  In all reported observations, 
the matching was between these three nationalities.  
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Table 4: Choice to try to coordinate on payoff-dominant equilibrium in coordination game 
depending on the matching & co-variates (Probit regression) 
Model 
 






S if paired w/ 
compatriot 
C & 
NS if paired w/ 
compatriot 
C & 
S if paired w/ 
non-compatriot 
C &  
NS if paired w/ 
non-compatriot  
         
Compatriot?   0.055
**  0.001     
  (0.025)  (0.987)     
Non-compatriot?      0.025  -0.012 
      (0.448)  (0.912) 
Identity  0.207
*  0.074  0.231
**  0.061 
  (0.062)  (0.556)  (0.012)  (0.588) 
Female?  0.090  0.097  0.029  0.149 
  (0.434)  (0.459)  (0.770)  (0.213) 
GPA  0.276
***  0.121  0.091  0.088 
  (0.000)  (0.216)  (0.199)  (0.345) 
Subject is Korean?  -0.227  -0.130  -0.153  -0.190 
  (0.126)  (0.394)  (0.224)  (0.157) 
Subject is Chinese?  -0.233  -0.085  -0.171  -0.060 
  (0.102)  (0.563)  (0.163)  (0.655) 
N  154  142  200  176 
Notes: Coefficients are average marginal effects. P-values in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust 
standard errors clustered on subject level. Compatriot = 1 if subject is paired with compatriot, 0 otherwise. Non-
compatriot = 1 if subject is paired with subject having a different nationality, 0 otherwise. Subject is 
Korean/Chinese? 1 if yes, 0 otherwise. Female = 2 if subject is a female, 1 otherwise.   27  
Appendix A: Pre-experimental Questionnaire 
 
1. What is your age? 
 
2. Please indicate your gender 
 
___ Male       ___ Female 
 
3. What is your major at UH? 
 
4. How long have you lived in the United States? 
 
5. Of which country are you currently a citizen? 
 
6. How strongly do you identify yourself with this country? 
 
___ Not at all    ___ Somewhat    ___ Very strongly 
 
7. Are you happy to identify yourself with this country? 
 
___ No              ___ Somewhat     ___ Yes 
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Appendix B : Experimental Instructions  
 
Treatment C (Control)  
 




Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with each other during the experiment.  
 
During this experiment you will participate in decision tasks that give you the opportunity to 
earn money. All the earnings in this experiment will be in dollars. Immediately upon completion 
of the experiment we will pay you your game earnings in CASH. You earnings are confidential 
and you will be paid in private. 
 
This experiment will consist of several parts. In each part, you will be asked to make 3 decisions 
which will involve another participant with whom you will be randomly matched.  For every 
decision task, you will be randomly matched with a different participant than in the previous 
decision. Your decision may affect the payoffs of others, just as the decisions of the person you 
are matched with may affect your payoffs.  
 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one task from each part as the 
paid task. The other tasks will remain unpaid. You will not be informed of the results of any task 
until the end of the experiment.  
 
We will proceed to the decisions once the instructions are clear. Are there any questions? 
Part 1 
 
In this part, you will be randomly matched with one other participant. Their identity will not be 
revealed to you and yours will not be revealed to them. 
You will be assigned a role: Proposer or Responder. Your role will remain the same for all three 
decisions in this part and in the next.  
Instructions to the PROPOSERS: A sum of 10 dollars has been allocated to the both of you.  The 
proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you.  The proposer’s task is 
to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder.  
Instructions  to  the  RESPONDERS:  The  responders  will  not  see  the  proposer’s  offer.  The 
responder’s task is to indicate the smallest amount which they will accept from the proposer. If 
the proposer’s actual offer to the responder is at least as large as the smallest offer responder is 
willing to accept, then the money is divided according to the proposer’s offer. Otherwise, neither 
of you will receive anything.  
Your decisions during this experiment will remain anonymous and private and you will not know 
the outcome of the decisions until the end of the experiment. You will be asked to make 3 
decisions in this part, and each time you will be matched with a different person.    29  
Any questions?  
 
Part 2 
In this part, you will be matched with different participants than before. You have not been 
matched with these people before. You have been assigned the same role as in the previous part 
(proposer  or  responder).  The  proposer  has  to  make  a  decision,  while  the  responder  has  no 
decision to make in this game. As before, you will not know the identity of the person you are 
matched with. 
 
Instructions to the Proposers: A sum of 10 dollars has been allocated to the both of you.  The 
proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you.  The proposer’s task is 
to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder. The responder has 
no decision to make in this game, so the money will be divided according to the decision of the 
proposer.  
You will be asked to make your decision three times, and each time you will be matched with a 
different person. 
Please make your decision as prompted on the screen. 
 
Part 3 
In this part, you have been randomly matched with another person. You have not been matched 
with this person before. Both of you will make decisions at the same time and your payoff in this 
part will depend on your decision as well as the decision of the participant with whom you are 
matched. Their identity will not be revealed to you. 
 
Your task in this part is to choose either “A” or “B” 
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•  If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “A” then both of you receive $7 each 
•  If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “B” then you get $8 and the other 
participant gets $1  
•  If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “B” then both of you receive $9 each 
•  If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “A” then you get $1 and the other 
participant gets $8. 
 
Now, please make your decision as prompted on the screen 
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Treatment S (Salient)    
 




Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with each other during the experiment.  
 
During this experiment you will participate in decision tasks that give you the opportunity to 
earn money. All the earnings in this experiment will be in dollars. Immediately upon completion 
of the experiment we will pay you your game earnings in CASH. You earnings are confidential 
and you will be paid in private. 
 
This experiment will consist of several parts. In each part, you will be asked to make 3 decisions 
which will involve another participant with whom you will be randomly matched.  For every 
decision task, you will be randomly matched with a different participant than in the previous 
decision. Your decision may affect the payoffs of others, just as the decisions of the person you 
are matched with may affect your payoffs.  
 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one task from each part as the 
paid task. The other tasks will remain unpaid. You will not be informed of the results of any task 
until the end of the experiment.  
 




In this part, you will be randomly matched with one other participant. Their identity will not be 
revealed to you and yours will not be revealed to them. All you will know about them is their 
nationality. 
You will be assigned a role: Proposer or Responder. Your role will remain the same for all three 
decisions in this part and in the next.  
Instructions to the PROPOSERS: A sum of 10 dollars has been allocated to the both of you.  The 
proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you.  The proposer’s task is 
to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder.  
Instructions  to  the  RESPONDERS:  The  responders  will  not  see  the  proposer’s  offer.  The 
responder’s task is to indicate the smallest amount which they will accept from the proposer. If 
the proposer’s actual offer to the responder is at least as large as the smallest offer responder is 
willing to accept, then the money is divided according to the proposer’s offer. Otherwise, neither 
of you will receive anything.  
Your decisions during this experiment will remain anonymous and private and you will not know 
the outcome of the decisions until the end of the experiment. You will be asked to make 3 
decisions in this part, and each time you will be matched with a different person.   32  
Any questions?  
 
Part 2 
In this part, you will be matched with different participants than before. You have not been 
matched with these people before. You have been assigned the same role as in the previous part 
(proposer  or  responder).  The  proposer  has  to  make  a  decision,  while  the  responder  has  no 
decision to make in this game. As before, you will not know the identity of the person you are 
matched with, except their nationality 
 
Instructions to the Proposers: A sum of 10 dollars has been allocated to the both of you.  The 
proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you.  The proposer’s task is 
to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder. The responder has 
no decision to make in this game, so the money will be divided according to the decision of the 
proposer.  
You will be asked to make your decision three times, and each time you will be matched with a 
different person. 
Please make your decision as prompted on the screen. 
 
Part 3 
In this part, you have been randomly matched with another person. You have not been matched 
with this person before. Both of you will make decisions at the same time and your payoff in this 
part will depend on your decision as well as the decision of the participant with whom you are 
matched. Their identity will not be revealed to you, except their nationality.. 
 
Your task in this part is to choose either “A” or “B” 
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•  If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “A” then both of you receive $7 each 
•  If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “B” then you get $8 and the other 
participant gets $1  
•  If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “B” then both of you receive $9 each 
•  If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “A” then you get $1 and the other 
participant gets $8. 
 
Now, please make your decision as prompted on the screen 
 
Treatment NS (Non-salient) 




Please note that you are not allowed to communicate with each other during the experiment.  
 
During this experiment you will participate in decision tasks that give you the opportunity to 
earn money. All the earnings in this experiment will be in dollars. Immediately upon completion 
of the experiment we will pay you your game earnings in CASH. You earnings are confidential 
and you will be paid in private. 
 
This experiment will consist of several parts. In each part, you will be asked to make 3 decisions 
which will involve another participant with whom you will be randomly matched.  For every 
decision task, you will be randomly matched with a different participant than in the previous 
decision. Your decision may affect the payoffs of others, just as the decisions of the person you 
are matched with may affect your payoffs.  
 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose one task from each part as the 
paid task. The other tasks will remain unpaid. You will not be informed of the results of any task 
until the end of the experiment.  
 




In this part, you will be randomly matched with one other participant. Their identity will not be 
revealed to you and yours will not be revealed to them. All you will know about them is: 
Age, Status at UH, Eye color, Hair Color, and Nationality. 
You will be assigned a role: Proposer or Responder. Your role will remain the same for all three 
decisions in this part and in the next.  
Instructions to the PROPOSERS: A sum of 10 dollars has been allocated to the both of you.  The   34  
proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you.  The proposer’s task is 
to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder.  
Instructions  to  the  RESPONDERS:  The  responders  will  not  see  the  proposer’s  offer.  The 
responder’s task is to indicate the smallest amount which they will accept from the proposer. If 
the proposer’s actual offer to the responder is at least as large as the smallest offer responder is 
willing to accept, then the money is divided according to the proposer’s offer. Otherwise, neither 
of you will receive anything.  
Your decisions during this experiment will remain anonymous and private and you will not know 
the outcome of the decisions until the end of the experiment. You will be asked to make 3 
decisions in this part, and each time you will be matched with a different person. 
Any questions?  
Part 2 
In this part, you will be matched with different participants than before. You have not been 
matched with these people before. You have been assigned the same role as in the previous part 
(proposer  or  responder).  The  proposer  has  to  make  a  decision,  while  the  responder  has  no 
decision to make in this game. As before, you will not know the identity of the person you are 
matched with, except their: 
Age, Status at UH, Eye Color, Hair Color, and Nationality. 
 
Instructions to the Proposers: A sum of 10 dollars has been allocated to the both of you.  The 
proposer gets to choose how the money should be divided between you.  The proposer’s task is 
to choose an amount between 0 and 10 dollars to be offered to the responder. The responder has 
no decision to make in this game, so the money will be divided according to the decision of the 
proposer.  
You will be asked to make your decision three times, and each time you will be matched with a 
different person. 
Please make your decision as prompted on the screen. 
 
Part 3 
In this part, you have been randomly matched with another person. You have not been matched 
with this person before. Both of you will make decisions at the same time and your payoff in this 
part will depend on your decision as well as the decision of the participant with whom you are 
matched. As before, you will not know the identity of the person you are matched with, except 
their: 
 Age, Status at UH, Eye Color, Hair Color, and Nationality. 
 
Your task in this part is to choose either “A” or “B” 
Depending on your choice and the choice of your match, your earnings will be the following: 










•  If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “A” then both of you receive $7 each 
•  If you choose “A” and the other participant chooses “B” then you get $8 and the other 
participant gets $1  
•  If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “B” then both of you receive $9 each 
•  If you choose “B” and the other participant chooses “A” then you get $1 and the other 
participant gets $8. 
Now, please make your decision as prompted on the screen 
 
Appendix C: Exit Questionnaire 
 
1.  What is your gender?              ___M       ____F 
 
2.  What is your major at UH?   ______________ 
 
3.  What is your GPA?               ______________ 
 
4.  How long have you been living in the United States? ___________ 
 
5.  How easy to understand were the instructions? ________________ 
 
6.  [Only applicable to NS treatments] When making decisions in this experiments, you were 
matched with another person. Which of their characteristics were most important in your 
decision?    ________________ 
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___ Yes      ___ No 
 
8.  If you do have friends in this session with you, did that affect your decisions in this 
experiment?  ____ Yes       ____No 
 
9. Did you like the experiment?  _____Yes      _____No 
 
10. Please add any additional comments you have about this experiment: 
 
Appendix D: Consent Form 
 
AGREEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS 
 
Principal investigator: Olga Bogach, Department of Economics, 
University of Hawaii, phone (808)-956-2325 
 
 
  This is a research experiment in economics of decision-making. The experiment has been 
explained  to  me  in  detail,  and  I  have  been  familiarized  with  experimental  instructions.  I 
understand that the experiment is voluntary, and participation is anonymous. The data collected 
on my decisions will be anonymous and will not put me at any risk. Although there are no risks 
to me, I will be paid $5 participation fee, plus whatever money I make during the experiment. 
There are benefits to the society from this experiment in studying economics of decision making.  
 
  I certify that I have been told of the possible risks involved in this project that I have been 
given satisfactory answers to my inquiries concerning project procedures and other matters and 
that I have been advised that I am free to withdraw my consent and to discontinue participation 
in the project at any time without prejudice. I understand that the experiment will take at most 1 
hour.  
 
  I herewith give my consent to participate in this project with the understanding that such 
project does not waive any of my legal rights; nor does it release the principal investigator or the 
institution or any employee or agent thereof from liability for negligence.  
 




If you cannot obtain satisfactory answers to your questions from the Principal Investigator, 
or have comments or complaints about your treatment in this study, contact: Committee on 
Human Studies, University of Hawaii, 2540 Maile Way, Honolulu, HI 96822. Phone: (808)-
956-5007   37  
Appendix E: Ultimatum and Dictator Game Results 
 
 
Table A1: Ultimatum and Dictator Game Behavior: Constellation of Nationalities in NS Treatment
Proposer's share  5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6 4.5 6.2 6.2 5.7 6.0
in ultimatum game 7 6 5 5 4 5 6 6 6
Proposer's share  6.0 6.0 5.8 6.6 6.8 5.6 7.3 6.5 7.3
in dictator game 6 6 6 5 5 5 6 6 6
Responder's minimum  1.8 1.8 2.7 2.8 4.2 3.3 2.5 3.0 2.6
acceptable offer 6 4 6 5 6 6 6 6 5
Notes: ja = Japanese, ch = Chinese, ko = Korean. Numbers in italics show the respective number of observations. Ja-ko, 
for example, shows the mean decision of the Japanese proposers matched with Korean responders, whereas ko-ja shows 
 the mean decision of theKorean proposer matched with a Japanese responder. 




Table A2: Ultimatum and Dictator Game Behavior: Constellation of Nationalities in S Treatment
Proposer's share  5.0 4.8 4.9 4.7 5.3 5.4 4.6 5.2 3.7
in ultimatum game 9 6 8 6 9 8 9 10 7
Proposer's share  6.2 5.8 6.3 6.8 7.9 7.4 7.1 7.6 7.6
in dictator game 10 6 8 6 8 8 9 10 8
Responder's minimum  3.3 3.6 3.6 3.2 3.2 1.9 3.9 3.6 3.5
acceptable offer 9 9 10 6 6 7 9 8 8
Notes: ja = Japanese, ch = Chinese, ko = Korean. Numbers in italics show the respective number of observations. Ja-ko, 
for example, shows the mean decision of the Japanese proposers matched with Korean responders, whereas ko-ja shows 
 the mean decision of theKorean proposer matched with a Japanese responder. 
ch-ch ch-ja ch-ko ko-ko ko-ja ko-ch Variable (mean, $) ja-ja ja-ko ja-ch
 
 